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for Catholic Theories of Just War 
 
 
Philip J. Rossi 






This essay starts from a presupposition that there is need for 
rethinking the theological framework within which the Catholic Church 
has articulated its understanding of the principles and the application 
of the theory of “just war” in the social teaching it has proposed since 
the conclusion of World War II.1 While it may also be the case that the 
articulation of just war principles within other Christian theological 
traditions needs a similar re-framing, my primary concern is with the 
place it has occupied within Catholic moral and social teaching for the 
last sixty years. I will first provide a brief overview of the main 
considerations why such rethinking seems needed, but the main thrust 
of my argument is to outline the direction that such rethinking could 
take. I will also propose that an important outcome of such rethinking 
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would be to provide a clear focus on the establishment of peace as the 
proper finality of a theologically informed just war theory.  
 
I. Is (Catholic) Just War Teaching Still 
Theological?  
 
The fundamental question posed in this section is: In what way 
can a theory of “just war”–at least as it is currently articulated in the 
Catholic tradition–any longer be considered “theological” or even 
“religious”? Though just war theory has long been a topic within 
discussions of Christian theological ethics, it no longer seems fully 
evident that a necessary condition for its intelligibility and/or its 
persuasive power is provided by its location or function within a 
theological or religious context. 
 
In order to show this, let me trace key portions of the historical 
trajectories along which just war theory has traveled within the 
Catholic tradition up to the start of the twenty first-century. Some 
conceptual elements of just war theory antedate Christian thinkers 
such as Augustine and Aquinas who made major contributions to its 
formulation and development. Just as they did with many other key 
concepts and theories from the intellectual milieu of their times, they 
each shaped those elements into congruence with the overarching 
theological concerns guiding their work. I hope that it is not too 
simplistic to say that they each deeply embedded the concepts and 
reasoning we now associate with classic expressions of just war 
thinking into a powerful theological context, even when those concepts 
did not themselves arise from an explicitly theological provenance. As 
James Turner Johnson has observed “just war doctrine in its classic 
form is not solely a product of Christian moral thought but derives also 
from two distinct secular traditions: the chivalric code and the legal 
idea of jus gentium.”2  
 
It is thus important to note, moreover, that even as Aquinas 
later appropriated elements of Augustine’s treatment of war into his 
own thinking, he embedded them into a theological context that, even 
as it was indebted to Augustine, was nonetheless different from that of 
Augustine. For instance, Augustine takes the injunction to love one’s 
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neighbor to provide theological ground for the possibility of 
legitimating war:  
 
...there are two distinct beginning points or emphases in 
Augustine’s view of the necessity of war. One is the practical 
political perception that social life demands that order be 
preserved, even if at the cost of violence. The other is the 
Christian religious conviction that love controls the entire moral 
life, even when violent coercion is morally demanded to serve 
the neighbor, punish the enemy, and protect the common 
good.3  
 
While Aquinas, like Augustine, will “approach the justification of 
violence from the standpoint of the needs of the political community 
and its citizens,” his account shifts the main weight of its theological 
focus away from what Lisa Cahill terms Augustine’s “tensive dialectic 
between caritas and concupiscence.”4 Of greater concern for Aquinas 
are considerations of right order and justice shaped on an Aristotelian 
model of political community, that within “the reality of an 
encompassing realm of divine activity and providence” has “its own 
coherency and positive raison d’être.”5 This shift in thinking about 
what justifies civil authority’s use of violence and, in particular, its 
prosecution of war to discharge its responsibility for the protection of 
order and the common good, was not simply a result of changes that 
took place in the intellectual context during the many centuries that 
separated Aquinas from Augustine. Not unlike the circumstances that 
surround more recent discussions of just war theory, it was also a 
response to concrete changes in the material conditions of the political 
and social order that had taken place in the West since Augustine’s 
day.6  
 
The Aristotelian elements that Aquinas brings to bear upon 
questions of war, however, do not completely displace the Augustinian 
elements, with the result that “in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas two 
quite different notions of a just war can co-exist without being 
explicitly contrasted.”7 In the subsequent development of just war 
thinking within Catholic theology, the Aristotelian side, particularly as 
systematized under the symbol of “natural law,” usually played the 
more prominent role. Catholic theologians of later centuries, such as 
Francisco Suárez and, most notably, Francisco de Vitoria, play an 
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important role in the refinement of just war thinking along lines based 
on natural law and the equally venerable notion of jus gentium (the 
law of nations).8 Vitoria’s contribution, which includes “the first clear 
and complete formulation of what has come to be conceived as the 
classic requirements of just war”9 arises, not surprisingly, in the 
context of the need to address a new set of circumstances, specifically, 
the Spanish conquest of the native peoples of the Americas. That 
Vitoria could offer an extensive and trenchant “just war” criticism of 
the Spanish policies–a criticism that did lead to at least some reform–
supports the claim made by James Johnson that “by the end of the 
Middle Ages just war tradition had solidified into a general cultural 
consensus on the justification and proper limits of the use of force.”10  
 
Even though Augustinian elements have not generally taken the 
lead role in shaping the more recent trajectory of Catholic just war 
thinking, they did appear prominently in other Christian theologians’ 
reflection upon war and civil order. The thinking of the Reformers 
appropriates Augustine’s emphasis on the central role of neighbor love 
and this theme recurs, in a slightly different key, in the work of 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey, two Protestant theologians who 
were major participants in discussions of just war in the middle years 
of the twentieth century. Lisa Cahill notes that:  
 
In the Augustinian tradition, the legitimation of violence is 
grounded in a killing-as-love paradox, and the extension of love 
to cover the “loved” victim is taken up by the Reformers. 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey also build violence out of 
love, though more narrowly as service to the vicitmized but 
innocent neighbor.11  
 
The Augustinian focus on love of neighbor places great weight on the 
proper inner dispositions and right intention of the one who, however 
reluctantly, must employ the violence justified by that love. Its 
fundamental measure thus applies first to intentions and dispositions, 
rather than to external conduct. Perhaps because of this–or perhaps 
because its articulation and defense rests, both for Augustine and its 
later proponents, on more explicitly Scriptural and theological grounds 
than is immediately evident in a just war theory framed in terms of 
natural law–this focus on love of neighbor has had far less impact on 
the articulation of just war theory as it gained stature as part of the 
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secular discourse of modern international law. While more the more 
general dynamics of “secularization” may have a role in the “de-
theologizing” of just war thinking, the principal phenomenon that has 
attracted my attention is the way in which this “de-theologizing” has 
happened even among the practitioners of theological discourse. A 
significant consequence of the trajectories along which just war 
thinking has traveled is that it now stands in what seems to be the 
unique position of being characteristically identified with the teachings 
of the Roman Catholic church12–and thus as paradigmatic of a 
particular form of Christian moral discourse–yet also sufficiently part of 
the general discourse of public policy and even of international law, 
that one need not be an adherent of any religious position, let alone a 
Catholic or Christian one, to recognize coherence and suasive power in 
its principles.13  
 
If I have correctly traced these historical trajectories of just war 
thinking, then it seems to be the case that it now regularly functions in 
public discussion–even when invoked by Catholic theologians and 
prelates–as a form of argument that, despite its historically long 
association with theological discourse and reasoning, neither stands 
nor falls on any particular theological principles or religious 
presuppositions. By one measure, this may be counted as gain–an 
instance, perhaps, of the capacity of human beings to grasp, through 
the exercise of reason, the truth of principles rooted in what Catholic 
theology has termed natural law. By another measure, however, a just 
war theory that stands apart from any recognizably theological context 
is puzzling in light of the dynamism of its origin and development, 
particularly if one remembers that the fundamental trajectory of the 
theological projects of Augustine and Aquinas enabled them to read all 
human activity–and indeed all of reality–in terms of its theological 
intelligibility. So what I propose to explore in the next section are a 
number of possibilities for providing just war theory, at least in its 
Catholic articulation, with a renewed, or perhaps even a new, context 
of theological intelligibility.  
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II. Toward a Renewed Theological Framework: 
Solidarity, Mutuality, and an 
Eschatological/Cosmopolitan Horizon of Peace  
 
In this section, I will propose two elements that I consider 
necessary for articulating a renewed Catholic theological horizon for 
just war thinking. The first element consists in the articulation of a 
theological anthropology of human mutuality and solidarity–i.e., an 
account of our human condition for which our relation to the divine 
serves as horizon of intelligibility for the dynamics of our relation to 
each other. I will argue that such anthropology can provide the setting 
for an understanding of our human action as morally efficacious for 
countering the roots of the deadly violence that seems embedded in 
the depths of our human relationality.14 While this human propensity 
to violence lends plausibility to Hobbes’s stark rendering of our human 
“state of nature” as bellum omnium contra omnes, an anthropology of 
human mutuality and solidarity makes it possible to envision how 
human action–both individual and collective–can bring about social 
conditions to disempower this propensity to violence. I will then 
propose, as a second element for this reframed theological horizon, a 
“eschatological-cosmopolitan” construal of hope as a social 
commitment to mutuality that provides conditions for empowering 
morally efficacious practice resistant to the draw to violence. Such 
hope, I argue, by enabling us to envision “the world as it ought to 
be”15 as a world in which we can render violence powerless by how we 
act, provides a measure for the efficacy of human action in securing 
conditions not simply for a diminution of violence but for the 
establishment of social order to make possible genuine civil and 
international peace.  
 
The theological horizon from which this anthropology of 
mutuality and solidarity can take shape is provided, in the first 
instance, by the narrative of Cain and Abel from the fourth chapter of 
Genesis. It is of no little significance that the first among the narrated 
social consequences of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden 
is the fratricidal violence that engulfs their offspring. This tale certainly 
suggests something both sobering and profoundly disturbing about 
how deep down violence goes in our human reality. It confronts us 
with a chilling reminder of how powerfully the enmity that leads to 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Catholic Social Thought, Vol 1, No. 1 (Winter 2014): pg. 229-240. DOI. This article is © Philosophy 
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
7 
 
violence can grasp us: Human hostility can rip asunder even the bonds 
of blood kinship. If the grip of enmity can wrest from us every last 
shred of fellow feeling for a sibling (“Am I my brother’s–or my sister’s–
keeper?”) it is hardly surprising that the socially organized enmity we 
call war brings us to seek the obliteration of those whose bonds to us 
have been experienced as less palpable and immediate than Cain’s 
were to Abel.  
 
Yet this primal story of violence also indicates one of the most 
fundamental coordinates on which our relations to one another as 
moral beings must take their bearing. I suggest that taking this story 
as an anthropological point of reference allows us to refocus the 
theological intelligibility of just war theory though the interpretive lens 
provided by Cain’s self-justifying rhetorical question, “Am I my 
brother’s keeper?” The ironic bite of Cain’s question–both for him and 
for us–lies in the fact that if Cain had recognized that he is, indeed, his 
brother’s keeper, there would have been no violence. It is thus no 
accident that this stark paradigm of human hostility expressed in the 
story of Cain and Abel is placed very early in the narrative that, for 
Jewish and Christian communities of faith, is constitutive of their 
relation to the One they name God. Within that narrative, the ruptured 
relation between the siblings Cain and Abel ensues upon the rupturing 
of the intimate relation their parents, Adam and Eve, once had with 
the God from whom they received the breath of life. In place of “the 
LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day” (Gen 3:8) in 
enlivening companionship with humanity, Cain’s invitation to his 
brother, “Let us go out to the field” (Gen 4:8), inverts fraternal 
companionship into a walk unto death. One does not have to make a 
long logical or imaginative leap from that bit of narrative irony to the 
insight that a fundamental condition that makes war possible arises 
when we put aside any awareness of being “one another’s keeper” and 
steel ourselves against any recognition of our fundamental connection 
to one another in human solidarity.16  
 
The Cain and Abel narrative has not, to my knowledge, 
functioned as a significant scriptural context for the articulation of just 
war theory in the documents formative of Catholic discussions of just 
war theory during the past six decades.17 Those documents–and, it 
seems, much of the just war tradition–seem to take it for granted that, 
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with conflict and violence so thoroughly interwoven in the fiber of 
human interaction, there is little point in reflecting further upon this 
episode emblematic of our readiness to break the closest of our human 
connections. At the same time, however, the larger framework of 
Catholic social teaching has recently given more attention to the 
fundamental role that “interdependence” and “solidarity” need to play 
in the institutional ordering of human activity in an increasingly 
globalized world.18 Though specific references to the Cain and Abel 
story are also sparse in this corner of the discussion, there is a clear 
thrust to make the interdependent character of human social existence 
and the mutual recognition of our individual and shared dignity as 
human persons a central conceptual locus from which action guiding 
principles–including those that constitute just war theory–are then 
articulated.  
 
This anthropology of solidarity and mutuality has already had an 
impact in some areas of the articulation of just war thinking within 
Catholic teaching. As noted earlier, the development of just war 
thinking within a theological context involved embedding it within a 
larger account of the role and responsibility of the sovereign power 
and its agents to promote the common good of civil society and its 
members. More recently, Catholic expressions of just war teaching 
have paid greater attention to the changed circumstances in which 
modern representative and democratic forms of political order have 
expanded the scope of citizen responsibility in the public realm in ways 
that bear upon the role an informed citizenry has in decisions about 
war and peace.19 While reaffirming the ad bellum requirement that the 
decision to go to war is made by “competent authority,” i.e., by the 
legitimate public authority of the state, the US bishops, in their 1983 
letter, The Challenge of Peace, also recognized that it was within the 
scope of responsibility of individual citizens at least to make their own 
judgments concerning the fulfillment of the ad bellum criteria, even as 
decision making power continued to reside in institutions of sovereign 
governance. Such a judgment could be, in the first instance, the basis 
on which citizens could exercise a right of “selective conscientious 
objection” to military service in a particular war. This empowering of 
the general citizenry goes beyond the responsibility to observe the in 
bello criteria that just war theory already recognized as residing in the 
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hands of individual combatants to refuse to follow orders in violation of 
the in bello criteria.20  
 
In addition, the bishops suggested, in at least two places in The 
Challenge of Peace, what seem to be a further extension of the scope 
of a citizen’s responsibility for moral judgment with respect to the ad 
bellum criteria.21 This extension provides a basis upon which all 
citizens, whether or not they are liable to military conscription, may 
legitimately voice and organize public opposition against decisions 
engaging their nation in a war they deem unjust. Implicit in the 
thinking that leads to this expansion of individual citizen responsibility 
are, not surprisingly, elements of a theological anthropology that is 
thoroughly social. This anthropology seeks to understand what it is to 
be human in the light of the human relation to God that encompasses 
humanity as a thoroughly social reality: A fundamental and 
inseparable part of understanding what it is to be human is 
understanding that human persons stand in relation to one another in 
light of their relationship to God. It is not just that humans are 
fundamentally social, it is that the social dimension of our humanity is 
itself part of the relation between humanity and God. How humans 
stand in relation to one another is fundamentally part of how we are 
oriented to God.  
 
That such a social anthropology is operative is not all that 
surprising, since, as I have already noted, it has informed many of the 
documents of the Catholic social teaching that have issued, both from 
Rome and from regional conferences of bishops, since the papacy of 
John XXIII. What has still been little explored, however, are ways in 
which this social anthropology of mutuality and solidarity thereby limns 
a horizon of social hope in which peace is envisioned as genuinely 
possible as the efficacious outcome of intentional human activity. This 
horizon of social hope enables us to envision the kind of human actions 
that render powerless our seeming propensity to violence and that 
secure conditions for the establishment of social order of genuine civil 
and international peace.  
 
This horizon of social hope is thus what I would like to sketch as 
the concluding element of this essay. The form in which I will articulate 
it issues from may appear as an unusual resource for Catholic social 
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thought: the cosmopolitan perspective of Immanuel Kant. I propose 
reading Kant’s cosmopolitanism from a framework of Christian 
eschatology–i.e., from a framework that, even as it affirms divine 
governance as the ultimate determining agency in the full and final 
ordering of history, also affirms a constructive role for human agency 
in the history that reaches its fulfillment in the attainment of “the reign 
of God.” This eschatological framework stands in consonance with the 
account of efficacious hope for the achievement of the “perpetual 
peace” that is integral to the constitution of the historical finality of 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Kant envisions “cosmopolitanism” as a re-
orientation of our perspective on the moral efficacy of human action.22 
It is a vantage point, enabled by the proper exercise of human 
practical (moral) reason–i.e., by our freedom–from which we empower 
ourselves and each another to envision the effects of our actions upon 
the socio-cultural matrix that constitutes the dynamics of history.23 It 
is a view upon our actions that sees them in terms of the social import 
they have in imparting a trajectory to the course of human history that 
accords with the moral worth and dignity proper to the freedom we 
exercise as we stand in mutual relations of respect for each other. 
Kant images this relationship as “a kingdom of ends” and as “an 
ethical commonwealth.24 One might be able to make a case that, in 
articulating “cosmopolitanism” as a social re-orientation of our 
perspective upon the moral efficacy of our freedom, Kant is quite 
literally seeking to “bring down to earth” at least certain elements of 
the dynamics of peace that had been envisioned in terms of the 
“heavenly city” of the Book of Revelation in the Christian New 
Testament. The re-orientation Kant proposes draws this “other 
worldly” eschatology closer to the visions of a restored Jerusalem that, 
in texts such as found in the later chapters of the Book of Isaiah in 
Hebrew scripture, serves to bring the blessings of a “this worldly” 
shalom upon humanity.  
 
The connection between eschatology and Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism that I thus put forth is the following: Embedded in 
the cosmopolitan hope for perpetual peace to which Kant gives the 
status of a categorical imperative is an eschatological claim that 
human action makes a genuine difference to the trajectory and 
outcome of history. At the heart of Kant’s account of a cosmopolitan 
perspective is a principle on which I think that he, Augustine, and 
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Aquinas all stand in fundamental agreement: human freedom and 
action make a real difference to the course of history and to our 
human destiny as individuals and as a species. In consequence, a 
cosmopolitan perspective–and, a fortiori, this eschatological 
perspective on the efficacy of human action–enables us to envision 
peace not as a mere utopian velleity that remains an unfulfilled wish 
ever beyond our capacity to effect it, but instead as a concrete 
outcome that is made increasingly possible by human activities that 
are effectively ordered to the construction of a world order providing 
conditions for lasting peace. It allows us to shape our actions with a 
view to making conditions conducive to peace the actual outcome of 
concrete activities and policies that are within our human power to put 
into effect.  
 
Crucial to the connection I am proposing here is that Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism and Christian eschatology, to the extent that they 
each stress the genuine moral efficacy of human action, thereby offer 
mutually reinforcing resources for envisioning human responsibility for 
the establishment of peace. Affirming such eschatological and 
cosmopolitan possibilities for human freedom to stand effectively 
against violence and, in so doing, to make a real difference in history 
has, I believe, relevance for an appropriate theological articulation of 
just war theory in the twenty-first century. It provides a horizon of 
hope for the effective power of human freedom that stretches beyond 
that envisioned by a “realism” that accepts the violence of war as an 
irremovable and inevitable feature of human life, and for which just 
war theory provides, at best, an imperfect tool for its occasional 
moderation.25 Within this horizon of a cosmopolitanism and 
eschatological moral efficacy for human freedom, human beings have 
the capacity, as agent participants in fashioning the history of the 
human species, for envisioning peace as a realizable outcome of their 
action and for enacting peace in the face of the dynamics of war. This 
is a horizon for envisioning peace not as an “impossible dream” that 
will come about only in the fullness of a divine eschatological time 
“beyond” history, but instead as a genuinely “possible dream” that can 
be brought to closer realization in human time, as a task that that has 
been entrusted to human hands to bring about. This task is to work to 
establish forms of social interaction that serve to bring about a 
peace/shalom that is marked by the presence of a relationality that is 
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authentically divine and a solidarity that is authentically human. It is 
within this horizon that an effective order of peace can be affirmed as 
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11 Cahill, 94.   
12 Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church 2309, which enunciates the ad 
bellum principles and 2312-14, which enunciates the in bello 
principles. It is important to note that, both in church documents in 
the writings of Catholic scholars, more recent articulations of the moral 
principles that should govern the exercise of civil and military authority 
in situations of international conflict move in a direction that indicates 
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a developing “peace ethics” has started to displace “just war” as a 
characteristically Catholic position. For perspectives on this 
development, see the final essays in From Just War to Modern Peace 
Ethics, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and William A. Barbieri, Jr., 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012: Robert J. Araujo, SJ, “The Holy See as 
International Person and Sovereign and Participant in International 
Law,” 249-273; Gerard F. Powers, “From an Ethics of War to an Ethics 
of Peacebuilding,” 275-312; and Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, “The 
Peace Ethics of Pope John Paul II,” 313-344.  
13 A resolution proposed to members of the American Philosophical 
Association in 2003 about the war in Iraq provides a striking marker of 
the extent to which just war theory can be understood as independent 
of a religious or theological frame of reference. The first sentence of 
the rationale for the resolution reads: “Both just war theory and 
international law say that states may resort to war only in self-
defense.”   
14 See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007) 656-710 for a useful discussion of the dimensions of violence in 
the context of the “immanent frame” of meaning that marks the 
contemporary cultures of secularity.   
15 See Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of 
Philosophy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004) 57-84, 314-
328, for a trenchant discussion of the moral and metaphysical 
important of the distinction between the world “as it is” and the world 
“as it ought to be.”   
16 An insight conveyed pointedly by Pope Paul VI in his October 1965 speech 
to the United Nations: “Si vous voulez être frères, laissez tomber les 
armes de vos mains.”  
17 The Cain-Abel story does provide a setting for the introductory discussion 
of the fifth commandment, “Thou shall not kill,” in The Catechism of 
the Catholic Church #2259. It is not, however, referenced in the 
discussion of peace and war that begins more than forty paragraphs 
later in #2302.   
18 See, for instance, Part I, Chapter II (§23-32) of Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) from Vatican Council 
II.  
19 This is just one of the changed material circumstances under which war 
has been initiated and waged in the 20th and 21st centuries that has 
had an impact on the structure, scope, and application of just war 
thinking. These range from the development of weapons technology, 
an international order in which sovereign nations no longer function as 
the sole actors, the incorporation of just war principles into various 
instruments of international law, etc.   
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20 The bishops pointedly observe that: “to refuse to take such actions [that 
are unlawful or forbidden in warfare] is not an act of cowardice or 
treason but one of courage and patriotism (# 311).”  
21 One is # 324, which urges public officials to be “particularly attentive to 
the consciences of those who sincerely believe that they may not 
support warfare in general, a given war, or the exercise of a particular 
role within the armed forces”; the second, # 328, quotes, Human Life 
in Our Day, an earlier pastoral letter: “In our democratic system, the 
fundamental right of political dissent cannot be denied, nor is rational 
debate on public policy decisions of government in the light of moral 
and political principles to be discouraged.”   
22 See Philip J. Rossi, “Cosmopolitanism: Kant’s Social Anthropology of 
Hope,” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: 
Proceedings of the XI International Kant Congress, ed. Stefano Bacin, 
Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, Margit Ruffing, (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, forthcoming 2013).  
23 See Philip J. Rossi, “Cosmopolitanism and the Interests of Reason: A Social 
Framework for Human Action in History,” Recht und Frieden in der 
Philosophie Kants: Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Vol. 
4, ed. Valerio Rohden, et al., (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 65-75.  
24 See Philip J. Rossi, The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical 
Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind, (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2005), 87-111.   
25 Susan Neiman describes such “realism” as “a form of sloth. If you tell 
yourself that a world without injustice is a childish wish fantasy, you 
have no obligation to work toward it” (Moral Clarity: A Guide for 
Grown-up Idealists, Harcourt, Orlando: 2008, p. 145).   
26 The increasing attention now being given to the importance of post-bellum 
considerations suggests that there may be more at work here than 
just the articulation of an additional set of criteria (parallel to those 
bearing upon ad bellum and in bello circumstances) for judging the 
moral adequacy of particular policies or conduct upon the cessation of 
armed hostilities. At work in the articulation of these post-bellum 
criteria may very well be an important structural alteration of its 
theoretical and practical trajectory in which just war theory can be 
appropriately reoriented to the finality of establishing an order of 
enduring peace, i.e. toward a an “ethics of just peace.”  
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